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Many Kyoto countries fear a loss of competitiveness due to unilateral climate policy 
efforts; policymakers therefore call for carbon-related border tax adjustments. With this 
paper we attempt to estimate the treatment effect of Kyoto commitment on bilateral 
export flows using regression-adjusted differences-in-differences matching techniques. 
The gravity and international environmental agreement formation literatures provide 
guidelines for the choice of matching variables. We find that Kyoto countries' exports 
are reduced by 13–14% due to Kyoto commitment. Trade effects are largest in energy-
intensive, homogeneous industries such as iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, organic 
and inorganic chemicals but also in machinery and equipment. 
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The Kyoto Protocol { signed in 1997, entered into force in 2005 { assigns emission ceilings
to industrial countries relative to their 1990 emission levels in the period 2008-12. Yet, it
covers less than half of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions because develop-
ing countries including major polluters like China and India are exempt en bloc and the
U.S. did not ratify the treaty. As a result Kyoto countries' politicians fear for the compet-
itiveness of their (energy-intensive) industries. They argue that increased costs of GHG
emissions due to Kyoto would put Kyoto countries' industries at a comparative disadvan-
tage. This was indeed the reasoning given by the U.S. for not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.
And it is the reason why Canada recently pulled out of the treaty. Classical trade the-
ory suggests that, in a globalized world, (GHG-intensive) industries should increasingly
produce in non-Kyoto countries and export their products to emission-constrained Kyoto
countries.1 So the question arises whether the Kyoto Protocol actually had an impact on
trade patterns. We will address the issue by investigating bilateral export ows.
The analysis of competitiveness issues seems crucial for the design of future climate
agreements. At the moment it seems politically infeasible to reach a global deal. Potential
Kyoto follow-ups would only apply to a sub-group of countries. If it turns out that
trade ows react to dierentials in climate policy, policymakers should think of ways to
address the issue. One instrument to level the playing eld currently debated, and for
example advocated by French president Sarkozy, is the use of carbon-related border tax
adjustments (BTA).
Related literature. The ex-ante analysis of competitiveness eects of unilateral cli-
mate policy is typically addressed in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.
Babiker (2005) uses a model with increasing returns to scale and an Armington demand
system. He nds competitiveness eects for an OECD emission cap, but the extent of
1This entails potentially detrimental eects for the environment. Emission savings in Kyoto countries
are at least partially oset, when the possibility to trade leads to the relocation of production (and thus
emissions) to non-Kyoto countries due to Kyoto commitment (\carbon leakage").
2locational eects depends on the assumed market structure. Manders and Veenendaal
(2008) use a dierent model and nd only modest competitiveness eects from a policy
to reduce emissions in the European Union in 2020 to 20 percent below 1990 levels when
accompanied by a BTA. In contrast, Babiker and Rutherford (2005) model the Kyoto
Protocol in a CGE framework and nd more substantial competitiveness eects. Recent
work focuses on border tax adjustments as remedies to the competitiveness and carbon
leakage problem. Mattoo et al. (2009) highlight how carbon-related BTAs could harm
developing economies. The most recent paper, by Elliott et al. (2010), investigates trade
in carbon and nds substantial carbon leakage ranging from 15 percent at low tax rates to
over 25 percent for the highest tax rate. Ex-post analyses of trade eects of environmen-
tal policy mostly embed a measure of environmental stringency in the gravity framework
(Jae et al., 1995; Ederington et al., 2005; Levinson and Taylor, 2008, see, e.g.). Studies
on climate policy are, however, scant. A study by the World Bank (2008) nds no sig-
nicant competitiveness eects of carbon taxes on energy-intensive trade ows. Aichele
and Felbermayr (2011) derive a gravity equation for the carbon content of trade. Their
study suggests that Kyoto commitment on average leads to increased carbon imports in
committed countries, thereby leading to leakage. Based on aggregate data and on a dier-
ent way to deal with self-selection of countries into the Protocol, Aichele and Felbermayr
(forthcoming) conrm these ndings.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, we use a dierent empirical
methodology that combines dierences-in-dierences estimation with matching techniques
to account for the endogeneity of Kyoto commitment. Second, beyond assessing the
average eect of Kyoto commitment, we provide an estimate of the average treatment
eect on the treated (ATT). From a policy perspective, this is the relevant estimate since
it informs about how Kyoto countries' exports { and not an average country's exports
{ have reacted to their Kyoto commitments so far. And nally, conducting a sectoral
analysis of Kyoto's eect on exports allows identifying which sectors' trade ows are
aected by the Kyoto Protocol and which are not.
Our empirical approach is motivated by theoretical and empirical work on the eco-
nomic fundamentals driving international environmental agreement (IEA) and particu-
3larly Kyoto membership. Since ratication of the Kyoto Protocol is a political process,
it is certainly not random. The empirical literature typically distinguishes economic, po-
litical and environmental determinants of IEAs (see Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Beron
et al., 2003; Egger et al., 2011, for examples). GDP or GDP per capita are important
variables. York (2005) stresses demographic change as predictor of Kyoto ratication.
And also free-riding on other's eorts might matter (Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Carraro
and Siniscalco, 1998). Egger et al. (2011) show that a country's trade openness aects
its probability to sign IEAs. Finally, the Kyoto status of important trade partners might
matter, as in the U.S.-China case. This is the basis for our empirical model to estimate
the likelihood of self-selection into Kyoto. The same fundamentals that determine se-
lection into the Kyoto Protocol also drive trade patterns (see Bergstrand, 1989; Eaton
and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, for seminal contributions in the
gravity literature). In this case, matching techniques are well suited to get an unbiased
estimate of the ATT. Although matching is typically used to study eects of, for exam-
ple, job training programs on labor market outcomes, several studies apply matching in
the gravity context (see Persson, 2001; Chintrakarn, 2008; Egger et al., 2008; Baier and
Bergstrand, 2009b, for examples).2 Fewer studies use matching techniques to estimate
the eect of environmental policies. List et al. (2003) employ a dierences-in-dierences
matching estimator to analyze the eects of environmental air quality regulation on plant
birth within New York state counties. Millimet and List (2004) extend the study by
analyzing heterogeneity in the ATTs for county characteristics.
For a sample of 117 exporters, of which 34 have Kyoto commitments, our estimates
suggest that bilateral exports to non-Kyoto countries are reduced by 15-20% due to Ky-
oto commitment. The average treatment eect for a Kyoto country was 13-14% only.
So our results highlight that not accounting for self-selection overstates the negative ef-
fect of Kyoto commitment. We report heterogeneity of Kyoto's treatment eects across
2Matching is a promising strategy in the gravity context, because it allows matching on relative
measures. The sheer number of country pair observations makes it likely to nd an appropriate clone (in
terms of joint GDP and distance etc.) for a country pair. This is certainly easier and more credible than
performing matching for countries. Arguably, it is impossible to nd a clone, say, for the U.S.
4sectors. Some sectors, e.g. iron and steel, organic and inorganic chemicals, plastics and
also machinery and equipment exhibit substantial negative competitiveness eects; while
Kyoto countries even expanded exports in some sectors, e.g. travel goods and handbags
or footwear. For about half of the products (27 out of 51 SITC product classes) we
cannot identify signicant eects, however. Consistent with theory, energy-intensive in-
dustries and sectors producing homogeneous goods are more strongly aected by negative
competitiveness eects.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical strategy
and data. Section 3 presents our results and robustness checks. Section 4 contains an
analysis of competitiveness eects on the sectoral level. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy and data
We are interested in how Kyoto commitment { i.e. the commitment to an emission cap
under the Kyoto Protocol { aects the exports of Kyoto countries. The unit of anal-
ysis is a country pair, i.e. an exporter-importer dyad (possibly at the industry level),
indexed by i = 1;:::;N. Let Dit 2 f0;1g be a treatment dummy that takes on the value
of one if country pair i's exporter has a Kyoto commitment in period t and zero else.
Working with a Kyoto dummy is certainly a crude assumption because the intensity of
Kyoto commitment might dier across countries. Nevertheless, this approach is common
in the treatment evaluation literature, see e.g. the literature on treatment eects of free
trade agreements (FTAs) (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), currency unions (Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2007) or other international environmental agreements (Ringquist and Kostadi-
nova, 2005; Aakvik and Tjtta, 2011). We assume treatment starts with ratication of
Kyoto commitment in national parliaments. The notion is that once ratication takes
place, governments adjust their policies and economic subjects adjust there expectations.
This assumption is also common in the evaluation of other international environmental
agreements such as the Helsinki Protocol regulating sulfur dioxide emissions (Ringquist
and Kostadinova, 2005). In a robustness check, we use the Kyoto Protocol's entry into
force in 2005 as alternative treatment date.
5Let Yit denote the outcome variable of interest: country pair i's value of bilateral
exports in period t (default sample). In a reduced sample, we restrict attention to exports
to non-Kyoto countries. This amounts to evaluating the eect of dierential status in
trade partners' Kyoto commitments. Yit is determined by Kyoto status and a vector of
standard gravity covariates Xit including GDPs, bilateral trade costs proxied by joint
FTA, WTO and EU membership, and multilateral resistance terms. Bilateral export
ows could also be aected by unobservable inuences. These might include dierences
in endowments, geographic location or climatic conditions, culture and also preferences.
Let ui be country-pair specic, time-invariant determinants of exports. The log gravity
equation can then be written as
lnYit = Dit + Xit
0  + ui + t + it (1)
where t is a common time trend and it is an i.i.d. error term. The coecient of interest
is Kyoto's treatment eect .
2.1 Self-selection into Kyoto commitments: problems and cures
A complication arising in the estimation of  is self-selection into treatment. Kyoto mem-
bership is the outcome of a political process and therefore not random. When selection
is on time-invariant unobservables like dierences in climatic conditions or endowments
in fossil fuels, dierences-in-dierences (DID) estimation eliminates ui from equation (1)
and recovers Kyoto's treatment eect.3 Yet, the likelihood of Kyoto commitment is inu-
enced by economic fundamentals also aecting bilateral trade ows. Economic size and
economic growth are important determinants, as well as GDP per capita. York (2005)
stresses the importance of demographic factors for Kyoto ratication. Rose and Spiegel
(2009) document that signing bilateral environmental agreements positively inuences bi-
lateral cross asset holding. The reasoning is that commitment under an environmental
treaty reveals a country's time preference. So commitment in the environmental arena
signals trustworthiness and furthers cooperation in other international forums. And Eg-
3See a similar discussion for self-selection into FTAs in Baier and Bergstrand (2007).
6ger et al. (2011) show that trade openness positively aects the number of international
environmental agreements a country signs. These arguments suggest that treated and
untreated country pairs may dier with respect to their economic fundamentals and thus
might dier in their willingness to commit to Kyoto and be dierently aected by Kyoto
commitment. It implies that the treatment eect for an average country diers from the
average treatment eect on the treated (ATT). As argued above, the ATT is the relevant
indicator of how Kyoto commitment has aected Kyoto countries' exports.
Selection on observable covariates suggests the use of matching econometrics.4 The
basic idea of the matching method is to nd untreated units that are similar to treated
units in terms of their covariates (also called matching variables) except for treatment
status, and thus establish experimental conditions. For a survey, see e.g. Blundell and
Dias (2009) or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). In the matching language, each unit has
two potential outcomes Yi(Di) depending on treatment status. The average treatment
eect (ATE) is the average dierence between treated and untreated outcome, and the
ATT is the average dierence between treated and untreated outcome conditional on
treatment
ATE = E[Yi(1)   Yi(0)];
ATT = E[Yi(1)   Yi(0) jDi = 1]; (2)
where E is the expectation operator. In actual data however, we can only observe one of
the potential outcomes. Either a unit is treated or it receives no treatment. Matching
econometrics infers the missing counterfactual by the outcome of country pairs j in the
properly constructed control group. The critical assumptions are that for every treated
observation with Xi = x there has to be at least one untreated observation with Xj = x
(overlap assumption) and once we control for covariates X treatment is randomly assigned
(ignorability assumption or selection on observables). A simple estimator of the ATT in
4Several studies use cross-section matching techniques in a gravity context. Baier and Bergstrand
(2009b) nd that matching econometrics helps to get economically plausible and more stable estimates
of FTAs' eects on trade ows. In a similar vein, Persson (2001) and Chintrakarn (2008) use propensity-
score matching to estimate the trade eects of currency unions.













where wij is the weight assigned to country pair j in the control group being matched
with country pair i and NT is the number of treated country pairs.5
One way to construct the control group and respective weights is based on the Ma-
halanobis metric (one-to-one matching, k nearest neighbors). The Mahalanobis metric
exploits the euclidean distance in matching variables between i and j, kXi   Xjk. With
one-to-one matching the untreated country pair j for which the Mahalanobis metric is
smallest (i's nearest \neighbor") is chosen as control and receives a weight of one; for all
other untreated pairs the weight is zero. Accordingly, in the case of k-nearest neighbor
matching, the k closest neighbors are chosen as control group with wij = 1=k.6 An al-
ternative matching approach dates back to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and matches
on the propensity score (one-to-one, k nearest neighbor, kernel, radius matching). Treat-
ment selection is modeled with a probit or logit model. We use a probit specication as
default. Country pairs are matched according to their probability of exporter's Kyoto
commitment. Nearest neighbor matching again uses the k nearest neighbors, but now in
terms of the propensity score. With kernel density matching, the control group comprises
all untreated pairs with propensity scores in the neighborhood of i (dened by the band-
width), where j receives a higher weight, the closer its propensity score is to i's. Finally,
radius matching uses all untreated pairs with propensity score dierences smaller than
the specied radius.
The simple matching estimator is confounded in the presence of unobserved hetero-
geneity. However, the framework is easily extended to a DID setup with time-invariant
5The same logic applies to retrieve an estimate for ATE. The summation then is over all country
pairs i = 1;:::;N and the counterfactual outcome is recovered by matching. In the following, our
representation focuses on ATTs but the respective ATEs can be estimated in a similar fashion.
6With continuous matching variables, the ATT will have a conditional bias depending on sample size
and number of covariates. Abadie and Imbens (2006) provide a bias-adjusted version that renders the
estimator N1=2-consistent and asymptotically normal.
8unobservables (see e.g. Heckman et al., 1997; Blundell and Dias, 2009). In its simplest
version, there are two time periods: a pre-treatment period (t = 0) and a post-treatment
period (t = 1). For a country pair receiving treatment, matches in the untreated group
are found on the basis of pre-treatment period covariates Xi.7 The ATT compares the
dierences between treated and control country pairs in the dierence between post- and















For example, Egger et al. (2008) apply the DID matching estimator to estimate the eect
of regional trade agreements on trade structure and volume.
The DID matching estimator assumes that changes in the covariates Xi follow a com-
mon time trend. This assumption is not likely to hold in our context, thus creating a bias
due to discrepancies in covariates. For example, non-Kyoto countries are predominantly
developing countries experiencing higher growth rates in GDP and GDP per capita than
Kyoto countries. Regression-adjusted matching estimators deal with this bias by correct-
ing for changes in covariates, see Robins and Ritov (1997), Heckman et al. (1998), Imbens
(2004) or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Heckman et al. (1997) for a DID version.
The correction typically is linear in covariates. In equation (4), (Yi1   Yi0) is replaced by
((Yi1 Xi1
0 ) (Yi0 Xi0
0 )) and (Yj1 Yj0) is replaced by ((Yj1 Xj1
0 ) (Yj0 Xj0
0 ))
(Heckman et al., 1997), where  stems from a regression of Y on X for the untreated in
the post-treatment period. This is equivalent to performing a DID estimation on equa-
tion (1) with weighted least squares. The weights stem from propensity score or Maha-
lanobis matching on pre-treatment covariates as described above. To our knowledge, the
present paper is the rst application of a regression-adjusted matching estimator in the
gravity context. The combination of matching and DID estimation has the advantage of
generating a quasi-experimental data set and will take us a long way in reducing selection
bias.
7Note that the basic DID matching estimator only allows for a common time trend in Xi changes,
such that the pre- and post-treatment distribution of covariates remain unchanged.
9A last issue meriting attention is that countries' ratication of the Kyoto Protocol
took place in dierent years. The rst committed countries to ratify the Protocol were
the Czech Republic and Romania in 2001. The bulk of Kyoto countries followed in 2002
and 2003 and late ratiers include Australia and Croatia in 2007. We deal with this by
analyzing averages of a pre- and post-treatment period.8 Dene a treatment period from
2001 to 2003 in which most countries ratied Kyoto. Pre- and post-treatment period are
chosen to be symmetric 4-year windows around the treatment period, i.e. 1997-2000 and
2004-2007 respectively. Note that using dierences in average outcomes before and after
treatment has the additional advantage of overcoming problems of autocorrelation in the
data (see Bertrand et al., 2004).
2.2 The choice of matching variables
Matching relies on the ignorability assumption. This assumption ensures that once we
control for covariates treatment is random. Put dierently, it reestablishes a dataset as
if from an experimental setup. So successful matching crucially hinges on the choice of
matching variables. The appropriate matching variables are those that inuence both the
decision to select into treatment and the outcome of interest. However, there exists no
test equivalent to a goodness-of-t test for model selection in the matching context. Thus,
we use theoretical insights from the public economics and gravity literature to guide our
choice. We bilateralize all covariates. That is, we search for clones that are similar, e.g.,
in their joint GDP.
Bilateral exports are determined by market size of exporter and importer, carbon
taxes, bilateral trade costs, price indices and production technology (see Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2003; Aichele and Felbermayr, 2011). Market size is measured by joint
GDP and joint population size. GDP and population growth are also typical determi-
nants of IEA membership (see e.g. Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Beron et al., 2003; York,
2005). We capture technological dierences in a country pair by the product of real GDP
per capita (the growth literature shows that GDP per capita and technology are closely
8This is also the approach taken in Egger et al. (2008).
10related) and emission intensity dierences in a pair. These variables also matter for Kyoto
selection. Advanced countries with a high GDP per capita might care more for environ-
mental problems. Emission intensity on the other hand represents reliance on fossil fuels
which reduces the likelihood for Kyoto commitment. Also trade openness matters for IEA
membership (Egger et al., 2011). Multilateral resistance (MR) is related to openness and
captures how close a country pair is to all other trade partners in terms of distance and
other trade cost measures such as joint WTO membership. So MR terms bear information
on how easy it is to nd other trade partners which is linked to competitiveness eects.
Therefore, we include MR terms for FTA, joint EU and WTO membership and bilateral
distance, contiguity and common language. We compute multilateral resistance terms
as linear approximations to price indices as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2009a).









k=1 klVkl where m;x
index the importer and exporter respectively, k and l are country indices, and k is coun-
try k's share in world GDP. V comprises the log of bilateral distance and dummies for
common language, contiguity, joint FTA, WTO and EU membership. In a robustness
check, we will also add political controls to the matching variables (see subsection 3.2
for details). A country's political institutions might inuence how easy it is to ratify an
international treaty in national parliament. And the political orientation might inuence
trade patterns.
There is no direct test whether the ignorability assumption holds. However, a balancing
test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is used to ensure that the distribution of
covariates is the same for treated and control pairs. The test checks whether the dierences
in the mean of each covariate between treated and matched control country pairs is
too large. The STATA routine also provides a measure of bias reduction (based on the
dierences in the mean of covariates between treated and untreated pairs). An additional
prerequisite in matching is the overlap assumption. Since we have about 12.000 country
pairs the overlap assumption is most likely fullled. Additionally, with propensity score
matching, we drop observations outside the common support { i.e. treated country pairs
with a propensity score higher than the maximum or lower than the minimal propensity
score of untreated pairs.
11Summarizing, our matching variables are log of joint GDP, log of joint population, log
of joint real GDP per capita, the exporter's energy intensity minus the importer's energy
intensity, and the six multilateral resistance terms. The list of covariates captures a broad
spectrum of determinants of bilateral trade ows which are related to IEA membership.
We hope this ensures that no variable is omitted that could confound the estimates.
Figure 1 shows that treated and untreated country pairs dier with respect to our
matching variables. In Panel (a), the kernel density function of the log of the product
of GDPs in a treated country pair (black solid line) is to the right of the untreated
country pairs' kernel (gray dashed line). This indicates that treated country pairs jointly
have larger markets. Panel (b) shows that treated country pairs are jointly smaller in
population size than untreated ones, although the dierence is not very distinctive. In
Panel (c) the log of joint real GDP per capita is to the right of the one of untreated
pairs. So treated pairs are jointly more advanced countries. The distribution of energy
intensity dierences does not dier (Panel (d)). Treated country pairs also dier with
respect to how close they are to other WTO countries (Panel (e)) and they also tend to
be geographically closer to other trade partners (Panel (f)).
2.3 Data description
Bilateral export ows for the years 1990-2009 stem from the UN Comtrade database. We
use total as well as sectoral export data. Sectoral bilateral exports comprise the 52 non-
agricultural 2-digits SITC Rev. 3 commodities.9 Nominal GDP, population and emission
intensities are obtained from the World Development Indicator (WDI) 2010 database.
Real GDP per capita is taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.0. Geographical
variables and bilateral distance measures are taken from CEPII. Joint FTA membership
comes from the WTO. The EU and WTO dummy are constructed from the homepage
of the EU and WTO, respectively. Information on the Kyoto status of countries stems
from the UNFCCC. A country is coded as Kyoto country when it has ratied the Kyoto
Protocol and is listed in the Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol. So only countries that
9See Table 4 for a list with sector descriptions.
12committed to an emission ceiling under the Protocol are Kyoto countries.
Our benchmark period is 1997-2007.10 The dataset comprises 117 exporters and 128
importers, 34 of which are Kyoto countries.11 This gives a total of 12,139 country pairs or
roughly 24,000 observations. 4,210 country pairs, i.e. about 35%, have a Kyoto exporter.
In the reduced sample, we focus on exports into non-Kyoto countries. Here, we have
roughly 17,000 observations. Of the 8,573 country pairs again around 36% of the exporters
have Kyoto obligations. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the default sample.
Figure 2 shows sectoral dierences between post- and pre-treatment period averages
in the log of treated pair's real exports minus the log of untreated pair's real exports, i.e.
the dierence in the average real trade growth trend in treated versus untreated country
pairs between these periods. Export ows are deated with the exporter's GDP deator
taken from WDI 2010.12 The dashed line indicates the overall trend. Kyoto countries'
real exports on average grew by 44% between the pre- and post-treatment period. The
respective growth for non-Kyoto countries was 35%. Hence, Kyoto countries' exports grew
by roughly 9 percentage points more. Albeit the positive overall trend dierence, 15 out of
the 51 goods categories experienced less export growth if the exporter was a Kyoto country.
The variation in sectoral trends is quite substantial. Iron and steel (goods category 67)
displays the largest negative growth dierence. Here, exports grew by 30 percentage
points less for Kyoto exporters. Other energy-intensive goods categories (black bars) are
also amongst the sectors aected most negatively by the exporter's Kyoto commitment.13
For example, plastics in primary form (goods category 57) with -12 percentage points
or chemical materials and products (goods category 59) with -11 percentage points less
10We also run a robustness check on 1995-2009 data, but caution that the nancial crisis starting in
2008 could bias the results if Kyoto and non-Kyoto countries were hit dierently.
11Liechtenstein is not in our data set due to data availability. Australia and Croatia are coded as
non-Kyoto countries because they ratied Kyoto at the end of our benchmark period, in late 2007.
12Using nominal instead of real export ows does not change the ordering of the goods categories.
13We follow the EU Commission and the U.S. Department of Energy
(http://www1.eere.energy.gov/industry/industries technologies/index.html) in classifying
goods as energy-intensive.
13growth. Most of the energy-intensive goods categories experienced a below average growth
trend. Other goods categories like cork and wood (goods category 24), travel goods,
handbags and similar containers (goods category 83) or pulp and waste paper (goods
category 25) had substantially more growth if the exporter committed to Kyoto. So
Figure 2 suggests quite substantial eects of Kyoto commitment on a sectoral level, where
energy-intensive goods categories are aected negatively. In Section 4 we will look into
sectoral eects in more detail, but rst we analyze overall trends in the following section.
3 Estimates of Kyoto's eect on exports
Before turning to our results, we will revisit the distribution of covariates. After matching,
tests for dierences in means are rejected for all our matching variables. The achieved
bias reductions are large. The kernel densities for treated country pairs (black solid line)
and the control group (gray dashed line) conrm this as well (see Figure 3). Although not
perfectly identical, the distributions are a lot more similar for the two groups. In light of
the ignorability assumption this is reassuring.
3.1 Baseline results
We apply the variants of the regression-adjusted DID matching estimator outlined in
section 2 (Mahalanobis matching and propensity score matching with nearest neighbors,
kernel or radius) to estimate the ATT of Kyoto commitment on bilateral exports. The
baseline results for the default sample including all country pairs are reported in Table 2.
Column (1) shows estimates obtained by a dierences-in-dierences gravity estimation
as benchmark. The gravity controls other than Kyoto commitment are log GDP of the
importer and exporter, log real GDP per capita of the importer and exporter, dummies
for FTA as well as joint WTO and EU membership, multilateral resistance terms for FTA,
joint EU and joint WTO membership, the energy intensity dierence, a period dummy
and a constant. The adjusted R2 is 0.293. So around one fourth of the within variation
in the log of bilateral exports can be explained with our model. The coecient on the log
14of the importer's GDP is 0.740 and statistically signicant at the 1% level. This implies
that a one percent increase in the importer's GDP increases bilateral exports by about
0.74%. The eect of an increase in exporter's GDP is not statistically dierent from
zero. The coecient on the log of the exporter's real GDP per capita is 0.605 and highly
statistically signicant. This suggests that more economically advanced exporters trade
more. The eect of the importer's real GDP per capita on the other hand is insignicant.
Joint WTO membership reduces exports by roughly 30%. Probably, this is because in our
sample period new WTO members typically are less developed countries. FTA and joint
EU membership increase bilateral exports by 17% and 30% respectively. Energy intensity
dierences are not signicant. Finally, the average treatment eect of the exporter's
Kyoto commitment is -0.082 and statistically signicant at the 10% level. This implies
that exports are reduced by about 8% due to the exporter's Kyoto commitment.
The next three columns show results on ATEs from regression-adjusted DID matching.
Column (2) applies 5 neareast-neigbor propensity score matching, column (3) uses kernel
propensity score matching and column (4) applies matching on the Mahalanobis metric
with 5 nearest neighbors. Compared with column (1), the magnitude and signicance
of covariates vary only a bit. Most notably, the exporter's market size now matters for
export volumes and the exporter's real GDP per capita turns insignicant. The models
in columns (2)-(4) can explain roughly 40% of the within variation of bilateral exports.
Note also that the number of observations reports country pairs used in the regression but
does not take into account the weighting procedure. 5 nearest-neighbor propensity score
matching (column 2) gives an estimate of Kyoto's ATE of -0.164, statistically signicant at
the 5% level. This suggests that bilateral exports are by 16.4% lower if the exporter has a
Kyoto commitment. The estimate is larger than under the standard gravity benchmark.
Kernel propensity score matching conrms this result. The estimated coecient is -
0.197, statistically signicant at the 1% level. With Mahalanobis matching with 5 nearest
neighbors, Kyoto's ATE is -0.152, signicant at the 5% level. Summarizing, our results
suggest an average country's exports are lowered by 15-20% due to the exporter's Kyoto
commitment. And Kyoto's ATE is larger in the quasi-experimental data set obtained
from matching.
15Columns (5)-(7) show Kyoto's ATT from regression-adjusted DID matching using the
same matching variants as in columns (2)-(4). The estimated eects lie in the range of
-0.13 to -0.14. So, our results suggest a Kyoto country's exports are lowered by 13-14%
due to the Kyoto commitment. Also, the ATTs are smaller in absolute terms than the
respective ATEs.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. The estimates suggest that bilateral ex-
ports to non-Kyoto countries are reduced by 15-20% when the exporter has a Kyoto
commitment. Our results also highlight that not accounting for self-selection on observ-
ables overstates the negative eect of Kyoto commitment: the ATEs are larger in absolute
terms than the ATTs. Kyoto countries' competitiveness is less aected by Kyoto com-
mitment than an average country's competitiveness. The ATT is around 13%. It follows,
that comparing treated country pairs with a properly constructed control group alters
results. In our context, it proofs important to use matching techniques to get closer to
an experimental dataset.
3.2 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we report robustness checks pertaining to the selection model used, the
assumption about when treatment occurs, the sample composition, the investigated time
horizon and the choice of matching variables. Table 3 summarizes the obtained ATTs
of Kyoto commitment from regression-adjusted DID matching. Column (1) replicates
the benchmark ATTs from various propensity score and Mahalanobis metric matching
variants to simplify comparison.
Logit selection model. Using a logit instead of a probit selection model for propen-
sity score matching does not aect the obtained ATTs, see column (2). The estimated
coecients again suggest a 13-14% drop in bilateral exports due to the exporter's Kyoto
commitment.
16Treatment period. The choice of the treatment period from 2001-03 might inuence
our results. As a robustness check, we vary the denition of the time window of treatment.
First, we include 2004 in the treatment period. Russia and the Ukraine ratied the Kyoto
Protocol in 2004. So by including 2004 in the treatment window, all ratications except
the one of Belarus (in 2005) and Australia and Croatia (both in 2007, they are therefore
assigned to the untreated group) fall into the treatment period. Pre- and post-treatment
period are again chosen to be symmetric periods around the treatment window: 1998-
2000 and 2005-2007. Column (3) shows that the ATTs from propensity score matching
are a bit smaller but still signicant using this alternative broader treatment period. The
results for matching on the Mahalanobis metric are weaker. Overall, the results are robust
to this alternative assumption on the treatment window.
Another question is whether treatment occurs with ratication in national parliament
or with entry into force of the Protocol in 2005. We use entry into force as treatment
date in a second robustness check. Then, the relevant pre- and post-treatment periods
are 1997-2004 and 2005-2007, respectively. Interestingly, the ATTs are again statistically
signicant in most propensity score models but now lie in the range of -5 to -9%, see
column (4). So the ATT from ratication is larger than the one from entry into force.
Since both models have basically the same post-treatment period, it seems that only part
of the observed negative competitiveness eects originates from entry into force.
Sample composition. So far, we have analyzed Kyoto countries' exports to all other
countries irrespective of their Kyoto status. In a next step, we limit attention to exports
into non-Kyoto countries. Column (5) reports results. Comparing the obtained ATTs in
column (1) and (5), the ATTs approximately lie in the same range but the eects are less
signicant. Turning back to the default sample, the estimated eects might be due to
special trends in China or economies in transition (EIT). Columns (6) and (7) show that
results are not sensitive to excluding China or EITs from Central and Eastern Europe
and the Baltics from the sample.
17Time horizon. In a further robustness check, we extend the time horizon to cover 2009
{ the latest year with data on all variables. Pre- and post-treatment period are again
chosen as symmetric windows around the default treatment period, i.e. 1995-2000 and
2004-09. Results are reported in column (8) of Table 3. We nd highly signicant ATTs of
around 20% in most specications. These eects are larger than in the baseline suggesting
that either eects are larger when taking into account the Kyoto phase 2008-09 or Kyoto
countries were hit more by the nancial crisis.
Political variables. So far, we have omitted country's political conditions. Whether
a country is e.g. politically stable or the government is left- or right-wing will inuence
its probability to self-select into Kyoto. The trade literature also discusses whether polit-
ical conditions inuence bilateral trade ows (see e.g. Manseld et al., 2000). We check
whether results are sensitive to including the durability index for political stability from
the Polity IV Project and political variables from the World Bank Database on Political
Institutions (DPI). The latter variables are FRAC: a country's fractionalization, SYS-
TEM: the political system, CHECKS: checks and balances which measures the number
of veto players, YRSOFF: the years the government has been in oce and GOV1RLC:
an index of the government's political orientation, right-left-center. To bilateralize these
variables, we take the maximum and minimum values in a country pair (see also Egger et
al., 2011). The only exception being SYSTEM where we use the similarity in systems by
taking dierences and GOV1RLC where we create four dummy variables for whether one
or both governments in a country pair are left or right wing. Column (9) shows the results.
Results are robust to including political variables in the matching process, although the
Mahalanobis matching seems less successful in nding a treatment eect. Given that the
number of matching variables is increased quite a bit, this might be related to the curse
of dimensionality.
184 Industry-level heterogeneity
Goods categories dier in terms of their average energy intensity, the degree of product
dierentiation and tradeability, and also in terms of the degree of regulation they are
subjected to. This can lead to heterogeneity in trade reactions to Kyoto commitment.
This is also reected in the political debate which focuses especially on eects on energy-
intensive sectors. So, studying aggregate bilateral exports might lead to aggregation bias.
This leads us to a sector-by-sector analysis.
4.1 Results on sectoral ATTs
We estimate the ATT for each of the 51 non-agricultural 2-digits SITC goods categories
separately. The matching weight is also obtained separately. We choose regression-
adjusted DID kernel propensity score matching as default. Table 4 presents our results.
17 categories display partly substantial negative eects in the range of 13-58%. Most of
these sectors fall into the category chemicals, non-metallic mineral and metal products
and machinery and equipment. For example, Kyoto commitment led to a reduction of iron
and steel (category 67) exports of roughly 51%. With an ATT of -28% non-ferrous metals
(category 68) are also substantially aected. And both non-metallic mineral manufac-
tures (66) and manufactures of metal exports (69) are reduced due to Kyoto commitment
by little below 20%. In the chemicals category, the aected sectors are organic chemi-
cals (category 51, ATT of -24%), inorganic chemicals (category 52, ATT of -18%) and
plastics in primary forms (category 57, ATT of -19%). In the machinery and equipment
category the negative ATTs lie in the range of 20-58%. The categories with the largest
eects in absolute terms are power-generating machinery and equipment (category 71)
and telecommunications equipment (category 76). Interestingly, we nd a total of seven
positive and signicant estimates. Examples are pulp and waste paper (category 25),
travel goods, handbags and similar containers (category 83) and footwear (category 85).
We perform several robustness checks on the sectoral ATTs. Table 5 reports the results
for all sectors with signicant eects in the baseline. Column (1) provides the baseline for
easier comparison. Column (2) uses a logit selection model. Column (3) drops China from
19the sample. And column (4) adds a host of policy variables to the matching variables. The
robustness checks conrm the estimates on sectoral ATTs both in terms of magnitude and
signicance. In the appendix, we also provide results on sectoral ATTs in the reduced
sample (Tables A-1 and A-2). Here, we nd less sectors with signicant eects. Yet,
the results are consistent for the categories chemicals, non-metallic mineral and metal
products and partly also machinery and equipment.
4.2 Interpretation
Our estimates suggest large heterogeneity of the Kyoto Protocol's eects on sectoral trade.
To understand these dierences, one has to turn to a more structural interpretation of
the underlying gravity equation. Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) use a well-specied the-
oretical model to derive such an equation. A decomposition of the overall ATT is beyond
the scope of the present paper, but the analysis in Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) shows
that the ATT confounds four elements: sectoral energy intensity, the elasticity of trade
ows with respect to cross-country cost dierences (essentially the elasticity of substi-
tution in a CES demand system), the eect of Kyoto commitment on production costs,
and industry-level transportation costs. Industries dier strongly along these dimensions.
The absolute value of the size of the estimated ATT is increased by the cost eect of
Kyoto (which is larger the more energy-intensive an industry is) or by the elasticity of
substitution (which measures the strength at which exports react to cost dierences). It
is decreased by the importance of iceberg trade costs in the sector.
We draw the following broad conclusions. First, for some industries we nd that the
ATT is statistically identical to zero. Then, Kyoto cannot have had any eect on the cost
structure. In industries where we nd negative ATTs, i.e. negative export elasticities of
Kyoto commitment, Kyoto aected sectoral costs. Second, among the goods categories
with negative ATTs, many are indeed deemed to be energy-intensive. Examples are iron
and steel, non-ferrous metals (like aluminium), non-metallic mineral manufactures (like
cement or clay) and manufactures of metal, organic and inorganic chemicals and plastics
in primary forms. Third, Figure 4 plots the sectoral ATTs against the average sectoral
20elasticity of substitution taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006). There seems to be a
positive relationship. This nding suggests that sectoral trade ows react stronger to
Kyoto commitment, the larger the elasticity of substitution. For example, iron and steel
(67) is a rather homogeneous goods category with a high elasticity of substitution of about
10. And we also observe a high ATT of roughly 50%. Similarly, non-ferrous metals (68) has
an elasticity of substitution of about 4 and an ATT of about 30%. However, there are two
outliers { goods categories 71 (power-generating machinery) and 76 (telecommunications
equipment). And the eects are also large in other machinery and equipment categories,
which are dierentiated goods according to the Rauch classication. However, these may
be goods categories with relatively low ad valorem transportation costs.
Moreover, there is substantial heterogeneity in how Kyoto may have aected sectoral
costs. Some sectors are exempt from regulation (this is for example the case under the
EU Emisisons Trading Scheme), some are more generously covered by subsidies. Many
sectors might not be aected directly, but rather indirectly because they use energy-
intensive intermediate products. Despite these complications, our results are broadly in
line with theoretical arguments.
5 Conclusions
The international policy community is still on the search for a solution to the threat of
global warming. Greenhouse gas emissions have detrimental eects on climate change irre-
spective of where they take place. If not all countries subject themselves to a world-wide
climate deal, unilateral climate policy entails competitiveness eects leading to carbon
leakage. This may undermine individual countries' eorts to curb emissions. Relocation
eects may even result in an increase of the global level of emissions. The economics lit-
erature contributes to this debate by (1) discussing whether international environmental
agreements are successful in achieving their goals and (2) by determining the eects of
environmental regulation on trade patterns. This paper contributes to the second thread.
The present paper sheds light on the eects of Kyoto commitment on trade patterns.
We use regression-adjusted DID matching to account for the possible endogeneity of
21commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. Our estimates suggest that an average country
faces a reduction of exports of around 15-20% due to Kyoto commitment. The average
treatment eect for a Kyoto country is smaller and in the range of 10-13%. So our
results highlight that not accounting for self-selection overstates Kyoto's negative eect
on exports. However, the eect is still large. Moreover, there is large sectoral heterogeneity
of Kyoto's ATT. We identify sectors that are aected by competitiveness issues. These are
typically energy-intensive industries like iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and chemicals
but also machinery and equipment goods. So our message is: Kyoto has had an impact,
at least on some sector's trade patterns.
This implies that unilateral climate policy like the Kyoto Protocol in and o itself
might not be able to bring down GHG emissions. Some emissions might relocate to
other countries. Thus, unilateral climate policy should be accompanied, for example, by
carbon-related border tax adjustments. These adjustments should be designed such that
they do not lead to green protectionism but that they help in restoring the eectiveness
of unilateral climate policy. An industry-by-industry approach may be sensible, as our
sector-level results suggest. Targeting the most energy-intensive and easily tradeable
goods by BTA may suce to restore the overall eectiveness of unilateral climate policy.
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27Figure 1: Kernel densities before matching (pre-treatment period)
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Note: The graph shows Epanechnikov kernel density functions of the matching
variables for treated country pairs (i.e. the exporter is a Kyoto country in the
post-treatment period) and untreated country pairs (i.e. the exporter is no Kyoto
country in the post-treatment period) for the pre-treatment period 1997-2000.
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Note: The graph shows the dierence in average pre- to post-treatment real trade growth
between country pairs with and without Kyoto exporter for all non-agricultural 2 digit SITC
Rev. 3 goods categories. Black bars indicate energy-intensive goods. The dashed line at 9.09
denotes the average aggregate dierence in trade growth, i.e. Kyoto exporters experienced
about 9 percentage points more real trade growth than non-Kyoto exporters.
29Figure 3: Kernel densities after matching (pre-treatment period)
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Note: The graph shows Epanechnikov kernel density functions of the matching
variables for treated country pairs (i.e. the exporter is a Kyoto country in the post-
treatment period) and control country pairs (i.e. the exporter is no Kyoto country
in the post-treatment period) for the pre-treatment period 1997-2000. Matches are
based on 5 nearest neighbor propensity score matching.
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Note: The graph shows a scatter plot of sectoral ATTs and average sectoral elas-
ticity of substitution taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006). The graph only
displays sectors with a negative and signicant eect from regression-adjusted DID
propensity score matching.
31Table 1: Summary statistics
Period: Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Ln exports 12,139 15.53 3.40 16.39 3.42
Kyoto (0,1) 12,139 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.48
Gravity variables
Ln GDP exporter 12,139 24.62 1.87 25.24 1.82
Ln GDP importer 12,139 24.38 1.94 25.01 1.87
Ln real GDP per capita exporter 12,139 -0.49 2.28 -0.35 2.29
Ln real GDP per capita exporter 12,139 -0.64 2.30 -0.52 2.30
FTA (0,1) 12,139 0.23 0.42 0.29 0.45
WTO (0,1) 12,139 0.63 0.47 0.77 0.41
EU (0,1) 12,139 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.21
MR FTA 12,139 -0.27 0.09 -0.35 0.11
MR WTO 12,139 -0.82 0.24 -1.08 0.24
MR EU 12,139 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.06
Emission intensity dierence 12,139 -10.42 424.05 -30.22 541.08
Matching variables
Ln joint GDP 12,139 49.00 2.51 50.25 2.43
Ln joint population 12,139 18.93 2.21 19.09 2.21
Ln joint real GDP per capita 12,139 -1.13 3.24 -0.87 3.24
Note: The table shows summary statistics for averages of the dependent, treatment, gravity
control and matching variables for the periods before (1997-2000) and after (2004-2007)
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 4: Sectoral ATTs of Kyoto commitment
SITC Sector label ATT SITC Sector label ATT
11 Beverages 0.077 61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., -0.279*
(0.110) and dressed furskins (0.167)
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures -0.562 62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. -0.216**
(0.506) (0.096)
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw -0.055 63 Cork and wood manufactures 0.097
(0.317) (0.105)
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits -0.471 64a Paper, paperboard and articles of -0.125
(0.442) paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard (0.094)
23 Crude rubber -0.143 65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up 0.135*
(0.182) articles, n.e.s., and related products (0.075)
24 Cork and wood 0.217 66a Non-metallic mineral manufactures, -0.199**
(0.236) n.e.s. (0.079)
25 Pulp and waste paper 0.700*** 67a Iron and steel -0.508***
(0.257) (0.115)
26 Textile bres and their wastes -0.008 68a Non-ferrous metals -0.282**
(0.123) (0.113)
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude minerals 0.018 69a Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. -0.179**
(0.136) (0.071)
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap -0.155 71 Power-generating machinery -0.566***
(0.184) and equipment (0.094)
29 Crude animal and vegetable 0.225** 72 Machinery specialized for -0.263***
materials, n.e.s. (0.094) particular industries (0.075)
32 Coal, coke and briquettes 0.658 73 Metalworking machinery -0.223**
(0.547) (0.103)
33a Petroleum, petroleum products 0.023 74 General industrial machinery, -0.243***
and related materials (0.248) n.e.s., machine parts, n.e.s. (0.077)
41 Animal oils and fats 0.437* 75 Oce machines and automatic 0.162*
(0.257) data-processing machines (0.087)
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, -0.243 76 Telecommunications and sound- -0.577***
rened or fractionated (0.201) recording and reproducing equip. (0.091)
43 Animal or vegetable fats and oils, -0.221 77 Electrical machinery, apparatus -0.283***
processed; waxes (0.189) and appliances, n.e.s. (0.073)
51a Organic chemicals -0.239** 78 Road vehicles (including -0.078
(0.104) air-cushion vehicles) (0.094)
52a Inorganic chemicals -0.184* 79 Other transport equipment -0.303**
(0.110) (0.147)
53a Dyeing, tanning and coloring -0.021 81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, -0.149
materials (0.094) plumbing, heating, lighting xtures (0.111)
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical -0.144 82 Furniture, and parts thereof -0.009
products materials, n.e.s. (0.087) (0.087)
55 Essential oils, resinoids, perfume ma- -0.089 83 Travel goods, handbags 0.426***
terials; toilet, cleansing preparations (0.087) and similar containers (0.107)
56a Fertilizers 0.101 84 Articles of apparel and -0.070
(0.249) clothing accessories (0.085)
57a Plastics in primary forms -0.189* 85 Footwear 0.250**
(0.103) (0.117)
58a Plastics in non-primary forms -0.075 87 Professional, scientic and controlling -0.218***
(0.107) instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. (0.077)
59a Chemical materials and -0.065 88 Photographic apparatus, optical 0.175*
products, n.e.s. (0.087) goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks (0.098)
89 Miscellaneous manufactured -0.072
articles, n.e.s (0.065)
Note: The table displays ATTs from sector-by-sector regression-adjusted DID kernel propen-
sity score matching estimation. Dependent variable is log of bilateral exports. Controls not
shown. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. Signicance at 1%, 5%
and 10% indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. a Goods category considered to be energy-
intensive.
35Table 5: Robustness checks sectoral ATTs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SITC Sector label Baseline Logit w/o China Policy
51a Organic chemicals -0.239** -0.237** -0.230* -0.415*
(0.104) (0.104) (0.118) (0.234)
52a Inorganic chemicals -0.184* -0.178 -0.183 -0.231
(0.110) (0.110) (0.118) (0.203)
57a Plastics (in primary form) -0.189* -0.194* -0.103 -0.601***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.114) (0.200)
61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed furskins -0.279* -0.283* -0.337* -0.519**
(0.167) (0.168) (0.178) (0.259)
62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. -0.216** -0.216** -0.229** -0.629***
(0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.181)
66a Non-metallic mineral manufactures -0.199** -0.195** -0.183** -0.136
(0.079) (0.080) (0.087) (0.164)
67a Iron and steel -0.508*** -0.505*** -0.397*** -0.813***
(0.115) (0.116) (0.122) (0.309)
68a Non-ferrous metals -0.282** -0.282** -0.212* -0.483***
(0.113) (0.114) (0.122) (0.186)
69a Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. -0.179** -0.178** -0.192** -0.426***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.076) (0.135)
71 Power-generating machinery and equipment -0.566*** -0.564*** -0.501*** -0.449
(0.094) (0.094) (0.104) (0.307)
72 Machinery specialized for particular industries -0.263*** -0.261*** -0.238*** -0.356***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.079) (0.136)
73 Metalworking machinery -0.223** -0.224** -0.232** -0.645***
(0.103) (0.104) (0.112) (0.182)
74 General industrial machinery, n.e.s., machine parts, n.e.s. -0.243*** -0.240*** -0.228*** -0.261
(0.077) (0.077) (0.081) (0.163)
76 Telecommunications equipment -0.577*** -0.576*** -0.579*** -0.623***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.101) (0.191)
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s. -0.283*** -0.282*** -0.274*** -0.491***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.079) (0.125)
79 Other transport equipment -0.303** -0.296** -0.416*** -0.012
(0.147) (0.147) (0.155) (0.377)
87 Professional, scientic and controlling instruments and -0.218*** -0.219*** -0.206** -0.029
apparatus, n.e.s. (0.077) (0.078) (0.089) (0.132)
25 Pulp and waste paper 0.700*** 0.743*** 0.656** 1.673***
(0.257) (0.254) (0.280) (0.555)
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 0.225** 0.225** 0.232** 0.141
(0.094) (0.095) (0.097) (0.180)
41 Animal oils and fats 0.437* 0.439* 0.521* 0.313
(0.257) (0.255) (0.297) (0.325)
65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., 0.135* 0.138* 0.105 0.067
and related products (0.075) (0.075) (0.082) (0.140)
75 Oce machines and automatic data-processing machines 0.162* 0.165* 0.172* 0.301
(0.087) (0.087) (0.098) (0.183)
83 Travel goods, handbags 0.426*** 0.420*** 0.397*** 0.324
(0.107) (0.107) (0.120) (0.236)
85 Footwear 0.250** 0.245** 0.288** 0.327
(0.117) (0.117) (0.132) (0.313)
89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 0.175* 0.178* 0.104 0.178
(0.098) (0.099) (0.107) (0.174)
Note: The table displays ATTs from regression-adjusted DID kernel matching estimation
in the default sample. Weights are obtained sector-by-sector. Dependent variable is log of
bilateral sectoral exports. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. Signif-
icance at 1%, 5% and 10% indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Results only shown for
sectors with signicant eects in Table 4. Logit uses a logit selection model. Policy includes
political variables. a Goods category considered to be energy-intensive.
36A Appendix
37Table A-1: Sectoral ATTs of Kyoto commitment - reduced sample
SITC Sector label ATT SITC Sector label ATT
11 Beverages -0.166 61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., -0.264
(0.174) and dressed furskins (0.244)
12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures -0.339 62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 0.013
(0.689) (0.142)
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw 0.262 63 Cork and wood manufactures 0.042
(0.436) (0.165)
22 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 0.202 64a Paper, paperboard and articles of -0.186
(0.545) paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard (0.147)
23 Crude rubber -1.102*** 65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up -0.022
(0.296) articles, n.e.s., and related products (0.117)
24 Cork and wood 0.170 66a Non-metallic mineral manufactures, -0.229*
(0.480) n.e.s. (0.128)
25 Pulp and waste paper 0.102 67a Iron and steel -0.419**
(0.333) (0.174)
26 Textile bres and their wastes -0.159 68a Non-ferrous metals -0.787***
(0.194) (0.192)
27 Crude fertilizers, and crude minerals 0.195 69a Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. -0.200*
(0.224) (0.110)
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 0.287 71 Power-generating machinery -0.429***
(0.343) and equipment (0.146)
29 Crude animal and vegetable 0.045 72 Machinery specialized for -0.276**
materials, n.e.s. (0.151) particular industries (0.123)
32 Coal, coke and briquettes -0.182 73 Metalworking machinery -0.119
(0.779) (0.164)
33a Petroleum, petroleum products -0.445 74 General industrial machinery, -0.062
and related materials (0.344) n.e.s., machine parts, n.e.s. (0.113)
41 Animal oils and fats 0.408 75 Oce machines and automatic 0.024
(0.326) data-processing machines (0.130)
42 Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, 0.078 76 Telecommunications and sound- -0.449***
rened or fractionated (0.383) recording and reproducing equip. (0.136)
43 Animal or vegetable fats and oils, -0.679* 77 Electrical machinery, apparatus -0.203*
processed; waxes (0.384) and appliances, n.e.s. (0.114)
51a Organic chemicals -0.213 78 Road vehicles (including -0.070
(0.161) air-cushion vehicles) (0.138)
52a Inorganic chemicals -0.330** 79 Other transport equipment -0.264
(0.158) (0.265)
53a Dyeing, tanning and coloring -0.419*** 81 Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, -0.306**
materials (0.138) plumbing, heating, lighting xtures (0.154)
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical -0.166 82 Furniture, and parts thereof -0.013
products materials, n.e.s. (0.128) (0.128)
55 Essential oils, resinoids, perfume ma- -0.112 83 Travel goods, handbags 0.391**
terials; toilet, cleansing preparations (0.146) and similar containers (0.161)
56a Fertilizers -0.189 84 Articles of apparel and -0.226
(0.306) clothing accessories (0.147)
57a Plastics in primary forms -0.537*** 85 Footwear -0.053
(0.168) (0.195)
58a Plastics in non-primary forms -0.252 87 Professional, scientic and controlling -0.027
(0.164) instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. (0.125)
59a Chemical materials and -0.160 88 Photographic apparatus, optical 0.176
products, n.e.s. (0.134) goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks (0.140)
89 Miscellaneous manufactured -0.285***
articles, n.e.s (0.105)
Note: The table displays ATTs from sector-by-sector regression-adjusted DID kernel propen-
sity score matching estimation in reduced sample. Dependent variable is log of bilateral
exports. Controls not shown. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses.
Signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. a Goods category
considered to be energy-intensive.
38Table A-2: Robustness checks sectoral ATTs - reduced sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SITC Sector label Baseline Logit w/o China Policy
23 Crude rubber -1.102*** -1.105*** -1.203*** -0.722
(0.296) (0.302) (0.351) (0.441)
43 Animal or vegetable fats -0.679* -0.700* -0.666 -0.476
and oils (0.384) (0.389) (0.425) (0.499)
52 Inorganic chemicals -0.330** -0.298* -0.344* -0.457**
(0.158) (0.165) (0.176) (0.205)
53 Dyeing, tanning and coloring -0.419*** -0.450*** -0.423*** -0.493**
materials (0.138) (0.139) (0.146) (0.225)
57 Plastics (in primary form) -0.537*** -0.617*** -0.472** -0.846***
(0.168) (0.173) (0.201) (0.277)
66 Non-metallic mineral -0.229* -0.110 -0.095 -0.218
manufactures (0.128) (0.136) (0.149) (0.211)
67 Iron and steel -0.419** -0.461** -0.337 -0.516**
(0.174) (0.192) (0.205) (0.256)
68 Non-ferrous metals -0.787*** -0.701*** -0.665*** -0.619**
(0.192) (0.201) (0.222) (0.296)
69 Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. -0.200* -0.165 -0.182 -0.417**
(0.110) (0.119) (0.140) (0.181)
71 Power-generating machinery -0.429*** -0.339** -0.256 0.701
and equipment (0.146) (0.159) (0.162) (0.666)
72 Machinery specialized for -0.276** -0.336*** -0.332** -0.414**
particular industries (0.123) (0.127) (0.142) (0.201)
76 Telecommunications equipment -0.449*** -0.503*** -0.468*** -0.466**
(0.136) (0.141) (0.149) (0.217)
77 Electrical machinery, apparatus -0.203* -0.268** -0.243* -0.373**
and appliances, n.e.s. (0.114) (0.118) (0.129) (0.177)
81 Prefabricated buildings -0.306** -0.299* -0.183 -0.332
(0.154) (0.160) (0.173) (0.236)
89 Miscellaneous manufactured -0.285*** -0.256** -0.229* -0.390***
articles (0.105) (0.112) (0.133) (0.140)
83 Travel goods, handbags 0.391** 0.376** 0.432** 0.352
(0.161) (0.172) (0.189) (0.336)
Note: The table displays ATTs from regression-adjusted DID kernel matching estimation in
reduced sample. Weights are obtained sector-by-sector. Dependent variable is log of bilateral
sectoral exports. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. Signicance at
1%, 5% and 10% indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Results only shown for sectors
with signicant eects in Table A-1. Logit uses a logit selection model. Policy includes
political variables.
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